What is really a dispute?
A dispute is similar to that of a controversy.
According to Wikipedia.org, it is a state of prolonged public dispute or debate, usually concerning a matter of opinion. In the theory of law, a controversy differs from a legal case; while legal cases include all suits, criminal as well as civil, a controversy is a purely civil proceeding. In this case, we are having a dispute with the Malaysian Federation, People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, and three more countries since there are no legal cases such as a civil indictment which begins when a plaintiff files a document called a complaint with a court, informing the court of the wrong that the plaintiff has allegedly suffered because of the defendant, thus requesting a remedy and a criminal suit which begins when a person suspected of a crime is indicted by a grand jury or otherwise charged with the offense by a government official called a prosecutor.
Presently, the Philippines has four territories where we are standing for a legal claim. These territories are:
1. Macclesfield Bank or Zhongsha Islands is an elongated sunken atoll of underwater reefs and shoals in South China Sea and part of the disputed South China Sea Islands, centered around 16°00′N 114°30′E, east of the Parcel Islands. Macclesfield Bank is claimed by the People's Republic of China, Republic of China (Taiwan), and the Philippines. It is located east of the Parcel Islands, distantly southwest of the Pratas Islands and north of the Spratly Islands.
2. Scarborough Shoal, Scarborough Reef, or Panatag Shoal more correctly described as a group of islands and reefs in an atoll shape than a shoal, is located between the Macclesfield Bank and Luzon, Philippines in the South China Sea. As with most of the landforms in this sea, the sovereignty of the area is disputed. The Philippines, the People's Republic of China, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) all lay claim to the shoal. Most references exclude this atoll from inclusion in the Spratly Islands, of which the closest is 350 km to the southwest.
And the other two are the Sabah and Spratly Islands where this paper is about.
Since we are Filipinos, we are supposed to be the ones who know every strand which makes up the topic. Learning and being aware of the real thing behind the words is also keeping the citizenship not only by paper, but by mind and soul.
What is this so-called claim over Sabah and Spratly Islands? How do we get to claim them? Why pursue claiming them after all these years? What is the stand of the Government and as an individual, what can we do? These are only a few of the questions that may be bugging us while gaining knowledge about these matters but, the purpose of this paper is to make everything clear not only to Filipinos but to the global society as a whole.
Philippine claim over Sabah
Sabah Geographical Location and Topographical Features
Sabah is found in the northern part of Borneo where Brunei, a tiny oil-producing sultanate is also found. Sabah in rough translation means the land beneath the winds because it was not affected by tornadoes, cyclones, hurricanes and etc. Its relative location is Sarawak on the southwest and Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) to the south. South China Sea is on its west and north, Sulu Sea on the northeast and Celebes Sea on its east. Its coastline is roughly 800 to 900 miles and its total land area is 76, 115 sq. km. Sabah is 1,961 km from Hong Kong, 1,143 km from Manila, 1,495 km from Singapore, 1,678 km from Kuala Lumpur and 2,291 km from Taipei. (Note that it is nearer to Manila, which is the capital of the Philippines than that of Kuala Lumpur which is the capital of Malaysia.
History and “The Lease”
This dispute was all started by “The Lease”.
Before it, the territory, Sabah, was granted to the Sultan of Sulu as a gift of gratitude by the Sultan of Brunei for helping him from his enemies. From then on, it has been under the sovereignty of the Sultanate of Sulu.
On 23 January 1878, in exchange for modern weapons with which to keep Spanish colonizers away from the Sulu Archipelago, the ruler of Sulu, Sultan Jamalul Alam, leased the territory of North Borneo to Gustavus von Overbeck, an Austrian who was then the Austro-Hungarian Empire's consul-general in Hong Kong. This was accomplished via a trading company belonging to von Overbeck's British partner Alfred Dent, and later via the British North Borneo Company. Von Overbeck procured the necessary firearms and also paid the Muslim dignitary an annual sum equivalent to 5,000 Malaysian dollars (now known as ringgit).
The contract between Sri Paduka Maulana Al Sultan Mohammad Jamalul Alam, representing the sultanate as owner and sovereign of Sabah on one hand, and that of Gustavus Baron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent representing the North Borneo Company, on the other as lessees of Sabah, was executed on January 22, 1878. The Lease prohibits the transfer of Sabah to any nation, company or individual without the consent of His Majesty’s Government (“Government of the Sultan of Sulu”).[6] Less than a decade later, the Sultanate of Sulu came under the control of Spain and was forced to sign a document giving all of the Sultan's Properties in Palawan and Sulu (excluding Northern Borneo) to Spain. In 1885, Spain relinquished its entire claim to Borneo to the British in the Madrid Protocol
The key word in the agreement was "pajak," which has been translated by American, Dutch and Spanish linguists to mean "lease" or "arrendamiento." The agreement further states explicitly that the rights to the territory may not be transferred to a nation or another company without the sultan's express permission.
Madrid Protocol
The Sulu Sultanate later came under the control of Spain in Manila. In 1885, Great Britain, Germany and Spain signed the Madrid Protocol to cement Spanish influence over the islands of the Philippines. In the same agreement, Spain relinquished all claim to North Borneo which had belong to the Sultanate in the past.
The Philippine Claim
In 1906 and 1920 the United States formally reminded Great Britain that Sabah did not belong to them and was still part of the Sultanate of Sulu on the premise that Spain never acquired sovereignty over North Borneo [see Madrid Protocol] to transfer all its claims of sovereignty over North Borneo to Great Britain on the Madrid Protocol of 1885. This is so because the Sultan of Sulu did not include his territory and dominion in North Borneo in signing the treaty of 1878 recognizing the Spanish sovereignty over “Jolo and its dependencies.” North Borneo was never considered a dependency of Jolo. However, the British Government ignored the reminder and still annexed the territory of North Borneo as a Crown Colony on July 10, 1946. This was in spite of the fact that the British Government was aware of the decision made by their own mandated High Court of North Borneo in Sabah on December 19, 1939, that the successor of the Sultan in the territory of Sabah was Punjungan Kiram and not Great Britain.
The Philippine government firmly stands that the contract of 1878 was a lease, and not a transfer of ownership or sovereignty. Treacher, was present at the signing of the contract and as witness, he characterized the contract as a lease and referred to the money payment as annual rentals. The claims are of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and proprietary ownership to North Borneo. Philippines being successor-in- interest of the Sultan of Sulu derived its legal and historical rights in North Borneo. In the early part of the 1960’s it became an imperative for the Philippines, aside from the strong historical and legal rights that North Borneo is important to Philippine territory and vital to its security.
The Philippine government also argues that Overbeck and Dent (the leasors) did not acquire sovereignty or dominion over North Borneo. This is because, according to international law, sovereignty can be ceded only to sovereign entities (e.g. government to government agreement) or to individuals acting for sovereign entities (agreement between leaders of nations). Obviously, Overbeck and Dent were private citizens of their respective countries who did not represent any sovereign entities, but instead acted as mere businessmen who only acquired grant of lease from the Sultan of Sulu. Hence, neither of them did not, and could not, acquire sovereignty or dominion.
The Philippine government, therefore, strongly argues that the transfer of rights, powers and interest by the British North Borneo Company to the British Crown is not possible. North Borneo Cession Order of 1946 took place just six days immediately after the Philippines was declared independent by the United States. In the International Law, a transferee (British Crown) cannot acquire more rights than the transferor (British North Borneo Company). In other words, how can the British Crown exercise sovereign rights in the form of protectorate in 1946, when the British North Borneo Company did not exercise nor assume sovereignty over North Borneo? In other words, how can the British North Borneo Company transfer sovereignty to the British Crown, which the company did not have in the first place?
The Grant of 1878 was a Lease Agreement. Under this circumstance, the Philippine Government could not accept the dictum of Judge Macaskie. In the judgment, the Grant of 1878 was viewed as a permanent cession or sale, and that the money that is to be paid to the heirs is “cession money.” Recognition of the Sultan of Sulu of the Sovereignty of Spain over “Sulu and its dependencies” (the main island of Sulu and the tributaries) in 1878 and the eventual renunciation in 1885.
According to this interpretation, Spain acquired sovereignty over North Borneo in 1878 when it signed the protocol of March 7, 1885 with Germany and Great Britain. In that protocol of peace, Spain gave up all claims of sovereignty over North Borneo to Great Britain; hence, sovereignty over the territory was transferred to Great Britain. The document signed by the sultan in 1878, recognizing Spanish sovereignty over “Jolo and its dependencies,” had no mention on the inclusion of the sultan’s territory in North Borneo. It is important to first clarify that Spain never acquired sovereignty over North Borneo. In the protocol signed, the term “pretension” to sovereignty over North Borneo was used; hence, there was no essence at all that Spain was transferring sovereignty to Great Britain (a sovereignty Spain never had; it was merely a pretension). Second, “Jolo and its dependencies” was a geo-political unit different and distinct from the North Borneo possession. To give a more vivid example for this argument, let us try to examine Spanish geo-political units in its Asian positions, known as “Espana Oceanica:”
1. The Philippine Archipelago proper;
2. The Island and archipelago of Jolo, conformably with existing treaties with the Sultan of Sulu; 3. The portion of Northeast cost of Borneo that forms part of the dominion of the Sultan;
4. The Marianas Islands; and
5. Other territories which now belong or which may belong in the future to Spain.
North Borneo was not considered a dependency of Jolo. As shown in the list of “Espana Oceanica,” North Borneo was a geo-political unit different and distinct from the Archipelago of Jolo. It is clear that the sultan did not include his territory and dominion in North Borneo in signing the treaty recognizing the Spanish sovereignty. Another thing to consider was the Spanish Geo-political division in “Espana Oceanica.” In the Spanish geo-political law, the regulations were clear about that. Even if one would insist to assume that the signing of the sultan in 1885 recognizing Spanish sovereignty over “Jolo and its dependencies” resulted to transfer of sovereignty is still out of premise. Because in the protocol of peace in between Germany, Great Britain, and Spain, it was clearly stated that the Spanish claim of sovereignty was worded in the text as “pretension.” By this, it did not result in transfer of sovereignty from Spain to Great Britain. Therefore, the premise that Spain’s renunciation of sovereignty over its North Borneo territory in favor of Great Britain, which resulted in transfer of sovereignty from the Sulu Sultanate to Great Britain, was impossible.
The Malaysian Federation Formation
The Federation of Malaysia officially included Sabah as one of their states which made the Philippines felt the need to push through the return of the territory to the owners of the land who are its citizens. In 1962 during the Pres. Diosdado Macapagal's administration (the father of the present president, Gloria Arroyo), the Philippines formally claimed Sabah based on the Sultanate of Sulu heirs' claim on the territory. The Philippines broke diplomatic relations with Malaysia after doing so.
When a change of government in Indonesia ended its confrontation policy in 1966, the Philippines still continued to pursue its claim to Sabah. Since then, the passage of time and change of governments in Manila passed but never forgot the Philippines' claim even if it was said by Malaysia as unlikely despite records provided by the claimant.
Reasons for the claim revival
In the last few months the Malaysian authorities have been deporting, we are not sure if this is the right term for this action knowing the existence of legal claim to North Borneo, thousands of Filipinos from Sabah for being illegal and for lack of necessary documents. There are allegations of inhuman treatments and rapes by Malaysian authorities which are currently being investigated by both governments. It is also good to point out that illegal Indonesians are likewise being sent home through Kalimantan (Borneo part of Indonesia). Both the Philippine and the Indonesian governments have protested the mass deportation and have indignation rallies against the Malaysian action.
Since the time memorial the numerous ethnic tribes in the southern Philippines notably the Tausugs and Badjaos have been traversing the Celebes Sea from Sulu to Borneo and other parts of Indonesia. These tribes are sea faring people and settled from anywhere around the region. To curtail these movements, the Malaysians have decided to demand document from the Filipinos in Sabah. Undocumented Filipinos were deported and could only be admitted back when there are necessary papers presented. This situation is extremely hard especially to those who have fled the secessionist war during the seventies and eighties as they are refugees and do not have any travel documents. These Muslim Filipinos have considered Sabah as part of their domain as their ancestors have been doing centuries ago. That part of Southeast Asia is bound by common religion, history and people.
Stand of the Philippine Government on the Issue
As per official Philippine government stand, the Philippines will continue legal action through the international courts and also by bringing this claim again to the attention of the Malaysian government. One of the immediate objectives is to have the rent increased to what is a more realistic amount while a claim is still being disputed.
Philippine Claim over Spratly Islands
Geographical Location and Topographical Descriptions
The Spratly Islands are a group of more than 750 reefs,[2] islets, atolls, cays and islands in the South between Vietnam, the Philippines, China, Malaysia and Brunei. They comprise less than four square kilometers of land area, spread over more than 425,000 square kilometers of sea. The Spratlys are part of the three archipelagos of the South China Sea, comprising more than 30,000 islands and reefs and which so complicates geography, governance and economics in that region of Southeast Asia. Such small and remote islands have little economic value in themselves, but are important in establishing international boundaries. There are no native islanders but there are rich fishing grounds and initial surveys indicate the islands may contain significant oil and gas.
About 45 islands are occupied by relatively small numbers of military forces from Vietnam, the People’s, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Malaysia, the Philippines. Brunei has claimed an EEZ in the southeastern part of the Spratlys encompassing just one area of small islands above mean high water (on Louisa Reef.)
History
They were largely unknown to Filipinos until “Admiral” Tomas Cloma stumbled upon them in the 1950s and laid claim to some of the islands and called them “Freedomland.” The former Freedomland is now the Kalayaan group of islands of the Spratlys that the Philippines now occupies.
In 1947, this Filipino adventurer and a fishing magnate, discovered several uninhabited and unoccupied group of islands/islets in the South China Sea. This discovery is the principal basis for justification of Spratly islands territorial claims by the Philippines, along with basis from 1982 UNCLOS archipelagic doctrine. . Cloma, owner of a fishing fleet and a private maritime training institute, the PMI Colleges (formerly known as Philippine Maritime Institute), aspired to open a cannery and develop guano deposits in the Spratlys. It was principally for economic reasons, therefore, that he "discovered" and claimed islands in the Spratlys. The Philippines justifies its Spratly Islands claims principally on Cloma's 1947 discoveries.
On May 11, 1956, together with 40 men, Tomas and his brother Filemon took formal possession of the islands, lying some 380 miles west of the southern end of Palawan and named it Freedomland. Four days later, on May 15, 1956, Cloma issued and posted copies of his "Notice to the Whole World" on each of the islands as a decisive manifestation of unwavering claim over the territory. On May 31, 1956, Cloma declared the establishment of the Free Territory of Freedomland, ten days after he sent his second representation to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informing the latter that the territory claimed was named Freedomland. On July 6, 1956, Cloma declared to the whole world his claim and the establishment of a separate government for the Free Territory of Freedomland with its capital on Flat Island (Patag Island). Cloma introduced a distinction between his "Freedomland" and the Spratlys further west. This distinction later became part of Philippine foreign policy
Cloma's declaration was met with violent and unfriendly reactions from several neighboring countries, especially Taiwan. On September 24, 1956 Taiwan reoccupied nearby Itu Aba Island (Also known as Taiping), which it had abandoned in 1950, and intercepted Cloma’s men and vessels found within its immediate waters. The PRC also restated its own claim.
In the 1970s, after being jailed by Ferdinand Marcos, Cloma 'ceded' his claim to the Philippines for one peso.
Geopolitical Importance
We mentioned above that the islands in it are economically uninteresting. Until the end of 2nd world war they have been in political sense a terra incognita. In the fifties they lost their nearly worthless status and become - due to modified evaluation of the surrounding sea area - a bone of contention for the diplomacy and also military of the adjoining countries.
In the center of interest is not the masses of fish. Aside from Taiwan most adjoining countries maintain only coastal shipping for fishing, which adds only little to the gross national product. The sea area of the islands becomes attractive by their geostrategic position and presumed oil and natural gas reserves.
The sea area of the Spratly islands takes in the shipping traffic that passes the Streets of Malacca, Sunda and Lambok on and represents a very important interface between the Indian Sea and The Pacific Ocean. It is a maritime highway for the raw material and product traffic from the Asia, the Near East, Europe and Africa. The area of Spratlys is passed by:
• More than a quarter of the entire shipping traffic of the world (approx. 300 big ships per day)
• 30 % of the world trade
• 48 % of the Japanese commerce as well as a high part of the merchandise of and to South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia
• 70 % of the Japanese crude oil imports
The People's Republic of China, which claims wide, parts of the South-Chinese Sea (a designation by mistake), passed in 1992 a law that demands permission from every ship that passes the zone. The Chinese Foreign Secretary of State formulated: If China is not applying this law, “it does not mean that it gives up his right”. It’s evident, that possible passing allowances given or not given by Peking are hurting vital interests especially of Japan and Taiwan.
Given current economic growth rates the demand for energy of the Southeast-Asian countries will increase strongly. An exceptional interest found exploration reports stating that the area contains considerable oil and gas reserves. Explorations in the deeper sea are expensive and though almost three billion of US $ for explorations were spent to middle of the eighties years, the estimates about the available reserves differ strongly from each other another. They seem to be consistent in the point that approx. 70 % of the hydraulic carbonate reserves consist of gas. The most optimistic forecasting is Chinese origin's and comes to the result, that reserves in the Spratly Islands are broader than such of Kuwait.
After a thumb rule only about ten percent - particularly in the offshore area - can produced economically. In 1997 the oil production in the South-Chinese Sea was approx. 1,4 million barrels - at approximately 47 % have been produced in Malaysia, 11 % in Brunei and in the Philippines only 0,1 %. Gas Production in the South-Chinese Sea amounted in 1997 to approx. 2,3 billion Cubic Feet - Malaysia produced approx. 56 %, Thailand approx. 21 % and the Philippines under one percent. With look to the small amounts in particular in the Spratly Islands a leading consultant of an American exploration company says that the deposits are hardly worth the risk of war.
Legal Arguments
The Philippines base their claims of sovereignty over the Spratlys on the issues of res nullius and geography. The Philippines contend Kalayaan was res nullius as there was no effective sovereignty over the islands until the nineteen thirties when France and then Japan acquired the islands. When Japan renounced their sovereignty over the islands in the Treaty of Peace in 1951, there was a relinquishment of the right to the islands without any special beneficiary. Therefore, argue the Philippines, the islands became res nullius and available for annexation. Philippine businessman Tomas Cloma did exactly that in 1956 and while the Philippines never officially supported Cloma’s claim, upon transference of the islands’ sovereignty from Cloma to the Philippines, the Philippines used the same sovereignty argument as Cloma did. The Philippine claim to Kalayaan on geographical bases can be summarized using the assertion that Kalayaan is distinct from other island groups in the South China Sea because:
“It is a generally accepted practice in oceanography to refer to a chain of islands through the name of the biggest island in the group or through the use of a collective name. Note that Spratly (island) has an area of only 13 hectares compared to the 22 hectare area of the Pag-asa Island. Distance-wise, Spratly Island is some 210nm off Pag-asa Islands. This further stresses the argument that they are not part of the same island chain. The Paracel Islands being much further (34.5nm northwest of Pag-asa Island) is definitely a different group of islands.”
A second argument used by the Philippines regarding their geographical claim over the Spratlys is that all the islands claimed by the Philippines lie within their archipelagic baselines, the only claimant who can make such a statement. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stated that a coastal state could claim two hundred nautical miles of jurisdiction beyond its land boundaries. It is perhaps telling that while the Philippines is a signatory to UNCLOS, the PRC and Vietnam are not. The Philippines also argue, under Law of the Sea provisions, that the PRC cannot extend its baseline claims to the Spratlys because the PRC is not an archipelagic state. Whether this argument (or any other used by the Philippines) would hold up in court is debatable but possibly moot, as the PRC and Vietnam seem unwilling to legally substantiate their claims and have rejected Philippine challenges to take the dispute to the World Maritime Tribunal in Hamburg.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
Signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica, 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994
Part IV
ARCHIPELAGIC STATES
Article 46
Use of terms
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) "Archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and may include other islands;
(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as such.
Article 47
Archipelagic baselines
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
Article 48
Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.
Article 49
Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
Part V
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Article 55
Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.
Article 56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(a) Jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
(i) The establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) Marine scientific research;
(iii) The protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) Other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
Article 57
Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Article 73
Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it in conformity with this Convention.
Other Claimants of the Spratly Islands and part of it under their control
Country Claim Control
Brunei Does not claim any of the islands, but claims part of the South China Seas nearest to it as part of its continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In 1984, Brunei declared an EEZ that includes Louisa Reef.
China Refers to the Spratly Islands as the Nansha islands, and claims all of the islands and most of the South China Sea for historical reasons. These claims are not marked by coordinates or otherwise clearly defined.
Chinese claims are based on a number of historical events, including the naval expeditions to the Spratly Islands by the Han Dynasty in 110 AD and the Ming Dynasty from 1403-1433 AD. Chinese fishermen and merchants have worked the region over time, and China is using archaeological evidence to bolster its claims of sovereignty.
In the 19th and early 20th century, China asserted claims to the Spratly and Parcel. During World War II, the islands were claimed by the Japanese. In 1947, China produced a map with 9 undefined dotted lines, and claimed all of the islands within those lines. A 1992 Chinese law restated its claims in the region.
China has occupied some of those islands. In 1976, China enforced its claim upon the Parcel Islands by seizing them from Vietnam. China refers to the Parcel Islands as the Xisha Islands, and includes them as part of its Hainan Island province. 1. Cuarteron Reef
2. Fiery Cross Reef
3. Gaven Reef
4. Hughes Reef
5. Johnson Reef
6. Mischief Reef
7. Subi Reef
Indonesia Not a claimant to any of the Spratly Islands. However, Chinese and Taiwanese claims in the South China Sea extend into Indonesia's EEZ and continental shelf, including Indonesia's Natuna gas field.
Malaysia Claims are based upon the continental shelf principle, and have clearly defined coordinates. Malaysia has occupied three islands that it considers to be within its continental shelf. Malaysia has tried to build up one atoll by bringing soil from the mainland and has built a hotel. Malaysia controls the following islands in the Spratlys:
1. Ardasier Reef
(Terumbu Ubi)
2. Mariveles Reef
(Terumbu Mantanani)
3. Swallow Reef
(Terumbu Layang)
Taiwan
Taiwan's claims are similar to those of China, and are based upon the same principles. As with China, Taiwan's claims are also not clearly defined. Taiwan controls Itu Aba [Taiping Dao] Island
Vietnam Vietnamese claims are based on history and the continental shelf principle. Vietnam claims the entire Spratly Islands as an offshore district of the province of Khanh Hoa. Vietnamese claims also cover an extensive area of the South China Sea, although they are not clearly defined. The Vietnamese have followed the Chinese example of using archaeological evidence to bolster sovereignty claims. In the 1930's, France claimed the Spratly and Parcel Islands on behalf of its then-colony Vietnam.
Vietnam has occupied a number of the Spratly Islands. In addition, Vietnam claims the Parcel Islands, although they were seized by the Chinese in 1974. In the Spratlys, Vietnam controls 21 islands, reefs, shoals, and cays:
1. Alison Reef
2. Amboyan Reef
3. Barque Canada Reef
4. Central London Reef
5. Cornwallis South Reef
6. Da Gri-san
7. Da Hi Gen
8. East London Reef
9. Great Discovery Reef
10. Ladd Reef
11. Landsdowne Reef
12. Namyit Island
13. Pearson Reef
14. Petley Reef
15. Sand Cay
16. Sin Cowe Island
17. South Reef
18. South West Cay
19. Spratly Island
20. Tennent Reef
21. West London Reef
Parts of the territory under Philippine control:
1. Kota or Loaita Island
2. Lawak or Nansham Island
3. Likas or West York Island
4. Panata or Lamkian Cay
5. Pag-asa or Thitu Island
6. Parola or North East Cay
7. Patag or Flat Island
8. Rizal or Commodore Reef
Conclusion:
Arguments have been laid and studies are being continued. Now that we already know what are inside these issues, knowledge is still worthless if it is not applied. Yes, we know the concern but aren’t we going to do anything about it? We are Filipinos and where the country is involved, we are included, too. Let us not just stand and watch these territories be exploited by other countries wherein we know that they are legally and historically ours. Act. Fight for what is ours. Our moves may be small, but at least we are doing something for the homeland than just staring at these treasures which we deserve to have.
Sources:
http://search.japantimes.co.jp
http://www.epilipinas.com/SabahClaim.htm
http://en.wikipilipinas.org/index.php?title=The_Philippines_Claim_over_Sabah_and_its_Arguments.
en.wikipedia.org/?title=Spratly_Islands
www.thephilippineisland.com/islands/spratly-islands-philippines.html
http://www.focus-philippines.de/spratlyengl.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_Borneo_dispute
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/spratly-claims.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Macclesfield_Bank
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scarborough_Shoal
